Economic relations between Venezuela and the UK - September 2026
For British–Venezuelan economic relations, 2026 was a year of divergence between political sensation and economic reality.
For British–Venezuelan economic relations, 2026 was a year of divergence between political sensation and economic reality. Economic reality changed slowly: total UK trade with Venezuela over the four quarters to the end of Q1 2026 amounted to just £215 million, making Venezuela the United Kingdom's 133rd trading partner (less than 0.1% of British foreign trade). The key conclusions are as follows.
First. Sanctions asymmetry is the central fact of the year. The United States carried out a wide-ranging liberalisation through OFAC general licences (GL 46–62), whereas the United Kingdom did not relax its own regime but, in April 2026, technically tightened it by introducing a new end-use export control. British companies operate in Venezuela under American, not British, authorisation.
Second. The British presence is concentrated in gas, not oil. Shell and BP — both named individually in OFAC general licence GL 50A — obtained new licences in 2026 for cross-border gas fields (Loran, Dragon, Plataforma Deltana). The economic motive is not Venezuelan but Trinidadian: the Atlantic LNG plant, roughly 90% of which is owned by the two British majors, is short of feedstock.
Third. Half of all bilateral trade is the London insurance market. Of the £215 million in total trade, £109 million consists of insurance and pension services. This is the single largest line item — larger than whisky and pharmaceuticals combined — and it reflects London's role as a jurisdiction of freight, insurance and law rather than as a market for goods.
Fourth. The United Kingdom does not import Venezuelan oil. The largest single item of British imports from Venezuela is coal and coke (£21.5 million). The last recorded direct import of crude oil dates from 2019. At the same time, oil traders with substantial London structures — Vitol and Trafigura — control roughly two-thirds of Venezuelan oil exports.
Fifth. British funds earned more from Venezuela than the entire value of British exports to it. Ashmore Group holds Venezuela as the largest country position in its EM sovereign debt fund (9.3% against 1.6% in the benchmark), while London-based Altana Wealth posted a gain of 66% for 2025 and around 30% in the first trading days of January 2026. Yet not a single British investment bank or law firm has secured a mandate in the restructuring of Venezuelan debt.
Sixth. The "return of British companies" is accurate for exactly two companies. These are BP and Shell, and both are returning not to nationalised assets but under new offshore gas licences. No British holder of an arbitral award against Venezuela (Vestey Group) has publicly announced a return. No restitution of expropriated British property took place in 2026.
Seventh. The institutional infrastructure of bilateral relations remains weak and has barely been renewed. The British–Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce in Caracas has existed since 1951, but no evidence of activity in 2025–2026 could be confirmed; the London-based British Venezuelan Society and Chamber of Commerce is legally active but maintains no public calendar of events; no intergovernmental trade committee (JETCO) exists; and no Department for Business and Trade (DBT) trade missions to Venezuela took place in 2026. The only notable development was the resumption of foreign-ministry contacts on 2 March 2026.
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